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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RONNIE C. BYRD,

:

De f endant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 950399-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION ANP NATURE QF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Ronnie Byrd appeals his conviction for two counts
of possession of a controlled substance, third degree felonies,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (ii) (1996) (R. 12122).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion

for a new trial based on testimony referring to defendant's postarrest silence where defendant affirmatively waived his right to
remain silent and subsequently confessed to purchasing the seized
narcotics?
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion

for a new trial based on the State's failure to inform defense
counsel about changed testimony where the change did not impair
defendant's ability to present his theory of the case?
The standard of review is the same for both issues. The
trial court has a "wide range of discretion in determining"
whether to grant a motion for a new trial.
P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991).

State v. James, 819

This Court assumes that the trial

court properly exercised its discretion "unless the record
clearly shows the contrary."

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ANP RULES
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1) (b) (ii) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with two counts of unlawfully
possessing a controlled substance, third degree felonies,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (ii) (1996) (R. 7) .
The jury convicted defendant on both counts (R. 121-22).
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent prison
terms of zero-to-five years (R. 201-202).

Defendant timely filed

a motion for a new trial (R. 135). The trial court denied the
motion, and defendant timely filed his notice of appeal from the
denial (R. 209).
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 12, 1993, a surveillance team watched Pioneer
Park for drug activities (R. 358-59).

In the early evening, that

team consisted of one surveillance officer and a "take-down" unit
consisting of a marked police car driven by a uniformed officer,
Officer Kaufman, and an unmarked car driven by a plain clothes
detective, Detective Thurgood (R. 358-59, 408-409, 471, 474-75).
Officer Grant watched the north curb from the team's
surveillance station on the second story of a building across the
street (R. 359-60) . When Officer Grant observed a tan Escort
station wagon pull up, he focused his camera on the car, then
moved to his sixty-power spotting scope to observe the car (R.
362-65, 370). A man approached the passenger side of the car
where defendant was seated, appeared to have a short conversation
defendant, then walked away (R. 370-71, 482).
A second man ("seller") approached the passenger side (R.
371).

This man carried a "twist" (a package commonly containing

cocaine) between his thumb and forefinger (R. 354-55, 371). The
seller also appeared to speak to defendant (R. 371). The seller
then turned his back to Officer Grant, and when he turned around
again, he held a larger plastic bag that appeared to have several
twists in it (R. 371-72).
3

The seller passed the original twist into the car, then took
something else from the bag and passed that into the car (R.
372).

Defendant then handed the second man some cash, and the

car left (id.).
Officer Grant radioed the take-down unit that the passenger
in the Escort had purchased drugs (R. 410, 479). Detective
Thurgood followed the car, and Officer Kaufman joined him (R.
411, 479-80).

Officer Kaufman signaled the car to stop; although

the drive eventually complied, he took longer the usual to stop
(R. 411). Officer Kaufman approached the driver and spoke to the
driver and rear passenger while Detective Thurgood removed
defendant from the front passenger side (R. 411, 414, 482-83).
Detective Thurgood took defendant to the rear of the Escort where
he arrested defendant and informed him of his Miranda rights (R.
483).

Detective Thurgood then searched the front passenger area

and discovered a "twist" of cocaine and a "chip" of heroin under
the front passenger seat (R. 484-85).
On the way to jail, defendant admitted to Detective Thurgood
that he had purchased the drugs seized (R. 490). At trial,
defendant admitted that a drug purchase took place, but testified
that the driver purchased a package of "white" (cocaine) and one
of "black" (heroin) (R. 560-61).
4

The argument sections contain additional relevant facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Post-arrest silence.

Defendant claims that the

prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by
eliciting testimony about his post-arrest silence, as proscribed
by Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); therefore, according to
defendant, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
defendant's motion for a new trial based on the post-arrest
silence evidence.

Defendant's argument fails because: 1) he

waived his right to remain silent and agreed to talk to the
police; therefore, the Doyle proscription does not apply; and 2)
the record contains overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt,
including his confession.
2.

Failure tP disclose incvlpfltpry infprTTifrtipn. Defendant

also contends that the trial court should have granted his motion
for a new trial because one of the State's witnesses refreshed
his memory and consequently gave a different account at trial
than he gave defense counsel during a pre-trial interview.
Defendant argues that, had his counsel know about the change, she
could have tailored the defense accordingly.

The trial court

correctly found that any error was harmless.

Defense counsel

presented a coherent defense based on the evidence introduced.
5

On the other hand, the State presented overwhelming evidence of
defendant's guilt.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for a new
trial.

Defendant based his motion on two arguments: 1) that the

prosecutor elicited testimony commenting on defendant's postarrest silence; and 2) that a State's witness gave a different
account at trial than he gave defense counsel during their
interview.

In determining whether the trial court erroneously-

denied the motion, this Court allows the trial court a "wide
range of discretion".
1991).

State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah

This Court must assume the trial court properly exercised

its discretion "unless the record clearly shows the contrary."
Id.

For the reasons argued below, defendant has not shown that

the trial court exceeded the wide discretion it had to deny
defendant's motion.
POINT I
TESTIMONY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S POST-ARREST SILENCE
DID NOT JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CONFESSED TO THE CRIME
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted
his motion for a new trial because, according to defendant, the
6

State erroneously elicited testimony from the investigating
police officer concerning his post-arrest silence, and
erroneously cross-examined him about his failure to given the
officer the exculpatory version he told the jury.
Brief at 8-14.

Appellant's

Under the facts of this case, the trial court

properly denied the motion because: 1) defendant waived his right
to remain silent; therefore, the proscription against commenting
on post-arrest silence did not apply; and 2) any violation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Detective Thurgood testified that, after the stop, he
immediately arrested defendant and gave defendant a Miranda
warning (R. 483) . Defendant said that he understood his rights
and wanted to talk to Detective Thurgood (R. 483, 487).
Detective Thurgood told defendant that he had a videotape of
defendant buying drugs in Pioneer Park; defendant did not respond
(R. 4 84).

Detective Thurgood then left defendant in another

officer's custody and searched the car (id.).
The next time Detective Thurgood talked to defendant, he
said to defendant, "What's up, what's going on?" (R. 488, 490).
Defendant responded "that he just wanted to get high, and that he
purchased the drugs at Pioneer Park" (R. 490).
During cross examination, the prosecutor asked defendant
7

whether he ever told Detective Thurgood that the driver had
bought the drugs; defendant responded that he did not say
anything about drugs to anybody (R. 600-601).
Defendant claims that both Detective Thurman's testimony and
the cross-examination amounted to inappropriate comments on his
post-arrest silence.

Appellant's Brief at 8-14.

Therefore,

defendant's argument refers to two silences: 1) his failure to
respond to a declaratory statement from Detective Thurman that
did not ask for a response from defendant; and 2) his failure to
tell Detective Thurman the exculpatory version he told the jury.
A.

Doyle does not apply because defendant waived his right

to remain gilent.
The trial court did not determine whether the comments
violated Doyle. relying instead on its determination that any
error was harmless (R. 207). Nevertheless, Doyle elicited
testimony did not violate Doyle because Doyle does not apply to
this case.1
In Doyle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court held that the State violated the defendants' right

^his court "may affirm the trial courtfs decision to admit
evidence on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
assigned another reason for its ruling." State v. Gray. 717 P.2d
1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted).
8

to due process of law when it used the defendant's post-arrest,
post-Miranda-warning silence to impeach the defendant.
618-19.

Id. at

In Doyle, the defendants took the stand and gave an

exculpatory version of the events.

Id. at 613-14.

In cross-

examination, the prosecutor used the defendants' post-Miranda
silence to impeach the exculpatory testimony.

Id. at 614-15.

The Supreme Court found that this violated due process because
the Miranda warnings implied an assurance that no penalty would
follow from remaining silent, and because post-Miranda silence
"may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these
Miranda rights."

Id. at 618-19.

Since Doyle, the Supreme Court has limited its application
to post-Miranda-warning silence.

For example, the Court refused

to extend Doyle to comments on a defendant's pre-arrest silence.
Jenkins v. Anderson. 447 U.S. 231, 241 (1980).

Similarly, the

Court refused to extend the Doyle proscription to comments on
post-arrest, but pre-Miranda-warning silence.
455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982).

Fletcher v. Weir.

Also, when a defendant waives his

right to remain silent and tells police a story inconsistent with
his trial testimony, the State may use the inconsistency to
impeach defendant without violating the Doyle proscription.
Anderson v. Charles. 447 U.S. 404, 407-10 (1980).
9

In all three

cases, the Court distinguished Doyle because the government did
not induce the defendants' silence by giving the Miranda
warnings.

Jenkins v. Anderson. 447 U.S. at 241; Fletcher v.

Weir. 455 U.S. at 607; An<fergPP v * Chfrrleg, 447 U.S. at 409.
Similarly, the Miranda warnings in this case did not induce
defendant to remain silent.

To the contrary, defendant told

Detective Thurman that he understood his Miranda rights and
wanted to talk to the detective (R. 483, 487). Shortly after
affirmatively waiving those rights, defendant confessed "that he
just wanted to get high, and that he purchased the drugs at
Pioneer Park" (R. 490). Because Detective Thurman's Miranda
warnings did not induce silence, the Doyle proscription does not
apply.

Consequently, the State could elicit testimony about

defendant's post-arrest failure to respond to a declaratory
statement and post-arrest failure to give the exculpatory version
he told the jury.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in State v.
Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.), cert - denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991) . Harrison was convicted of murder after shooting
another man outside a nightclub.

At trial, Harrison contended

that he shot the victim after he saw a revolver in the victim's

10

waistband.

The prosecutor commented:

The most incredible story, the added detail of the
chrome plated revolver that he saw so well from a
distance of fifteen feet sticking out of the waistband
of the dead man. Waistband? Waistband? On a dark end
street with some back lit things from the Persepolis
restaurant? Hefs so sure he saw that that hefs willing
to kill a man. No, that's an added detail. He made that
up later. He never tells anybody about that.
Id. at 787 (emphasis added).

Harrison contended that the comment

violated Doyle because the prosecutor used his failure to give
his exculpatory explanation to police to impeach his trial
testimony.

Id.

This Court held that Doyle did not apply because

the record contained no evidence that Harrison ever invoked his
right to remain silent.

Id. at 788.

In this case, defendant not only failed to invoke his right,
he affirmatively waived it.

In this case, as in Harrison. Doyle

did not proscribe Detective Thurgood's testimony or the
prosecutor's cross-examination questions.
Additionally, defendant's trial testimony independently
justified the State's cross-examination about defendant's failure
to tell Detective Thurman that the driver, not he, purchased the
drugs.

When a defendant waives his right to remain silent and

gives police a statement, but then gives an inconsistent
statement version at trial, the State may impeach the defendant

11

with his failure to give the trial version to the police.
Anderson v. Charles. 447 U.S. at 409; State v. Velarde. 675 P.2d
1194, 1195-96 (Utah 1984).

In that circumstance, the

prosecutor's questioning does not comment on the defendant's
exercise of his right to remain silent; rather, it asks defendant
to explain why, if he testified truthfully, he did not tell
police the same story.

Anderson v. Charles. 447 U.S. at 409.

In Velarde. Velarde told the jury a different version of the
events than he told the arresting officer.
P.2d at 1195.

State v. Velarde. 675

On cross-examination, the prosecutor "asked why

[Velarde] had not told the officer that which he had testified to
on direct examination."

Id.

The supreme court concluded that

the prosecutor legitimately used the failure to give the
exculpatory version to police as a means to impeach Velarde.

Id.

at 1195-96.
In this case, as in Velarde, the State properly impeached
defendant's trial testimony with his failure to recount to
Detective Thurgood the same version of the events that he
recounted to the jury.
purchased the drugs.

Defendant told Detective Thurgood that he

At trial, however, he testified that the

driver, not he, purchased the drugs, that he never even touched
the drugs, that he was just haplessly present when the driver
12

made the purchase, and that he was outraged that the driver
involved him in the transaction (R. 556-63, 614-16).

Under

Velarde, the State could properly point out that defendant did
not give this version to police.
Finally, although defendant waived his right to remain
silent, he could have invoked that right at any time during
questioning.

See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 898-99

(Utah App. 1993).

However, invoking the right after an initial

valid waiver requires the defendant to invoke the right
''sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for
an attorney."

Davis v. U.S.. 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355

(1994)(requiring a clear request for counsel following an initial
waiver of that right). £££. also Coleman v. Sinaletary. 3 0 F.3d
1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1994)(applying the Davis standard to
subsequent invocations of the right to remain silent), cert,
denied. 115 S. Ct. 1801 (1995); State v. Leyva. 906 P.2d 894, 901
n.3 (Utah App. 1995)(recognizing the Davis standard for an
invocation of either right following an initial valid waiver),
cert, granted. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996).2

2

Although this Court acknowledged in Leyva that Davis
applies to cases like this where the defendant initially waives
13

Defendant has not argued and cannot show a subsequent
invocation of his right to remain silent.

Detective Thurgood

informed defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant
affirmatively waived them (R. 483, 487). Detective Thurgood then
told defendant that he had a video tape of defendant purchasing
drugs; defendant did not respond (R. 484). The next time
Detective Thurgood spoke to defendant, he asked defendant what
happened and defendant confessed to purchasing the drugs (R. 4 88490).

At no time did defendant make any statement or do anything

that a reasonable officer would have understood amounted to
invoking his right to silence, including his failure to respond
to the detective's single statement that did not directly ask for
defendant to respond.
In sum, the Doyle proscription against using post-arrest
silence to impeach defendant does not apply to this case.

The

Miranda warnings did not induce silence; to the contrary,
defendant affirmatively waived his rights and ultimately
confessed.

Moreover, he testified at trial to a version of the

his Miranda rights, the Court also held that it did not apply to
cases where the initial waiver was ambiguous. State v. Leyva,
906 P.2d at 899-901. The State disagrees with that portion of
Leyva, and the Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
review the question.
14

events different from that he recounted to the police.

Finally,

he never invoked his right to silence after he waived it; at
most, he failed to respond to one statement from Detective
Thurgood that did not elicit a response.

Therefore, the trial

court correctly denied his motion for a new trial on this basis.

B.

Alternativelyi references to defendant's post-Miranda
silence were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial
because it found that, even assuming an error occurred, the error
had not prejudiced defendant (R. 207). Because any error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the record fails to show that
the trial court clearly abused its discretion.

See State v.

Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah App. 1989)(applying the
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard to an alleged Doyle
violation).
A number of factors help determine whether an error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, including the strength of the
State's case.

State v. Villareal. 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah

1995)(citation omitted).

In this case, the record contains

overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt independent from the
testimony and cross-examination about which defendant complains.
Most significantly, defendant admitted to Detective Thurgood that

15

he purchased the drugs because he wanted to get high (R. 4 90) .3
Defendant also excessively minimizes the circumstantial
evidence against him, acknowledging only Officer Grant's
testimony and the videotape.

Appellant's Brief at 11. However,

when considered in its totality, the circumstantial establishes
that defendant, not the driver, purchased the drugs.
Officer Grant testified that he saw two people approach the
open, front passenger, not driver, window (R. 370-71).

The first

man left, the second engaged in what Officer Grant's experience
told him was a drug transaction (R. 371-72).
the driver's window.

No one approached

Officer Grant saw no movements to suggest

that the driver leaned over to purchase the drugs, and defendant
denied that he had passed the drugs or the money between the
driver and the seller (R. 385, 562). Officer Grant saw the
passenger pass money out of the window to the seller (R. 372).
When Officer Kaufman and Detective Thurgood pulled the Escort
over, they found defendant in the front passenger seat (R. 412,
482) .

defendant attempts to dismiss his confession as incredible.
Appellant's Brief at 11. Defendant's argument ignores that, on
appeal, credibility determinations are resolved against him. Cf.
State v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996) (on appeal from a jury
verdict, the appellate courts view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to that verdict).
16

Defendant admitted that the drug transaction occurred at
Pioneer park, but denied confessing to the police and testified
that the driver, not he, purchased "white" (cocaine) and "black"
(heroin) (R. 560-61),

Defendant's use of the street names showed

he was no novice on the topic.

Moreover, Detective Thurgood

found cocaine and heroin under defendant's, not the driver's,
seat; there was nothing else under the passenger's seat (R. 485,
491-93).

Defendant acknowledged that he never saw the driver or

rear passenger put the cocaine and heroin under his seat (R. 589,
592, 611). Detective Thurgood testified that the driver could
not have placed it under defendant's seat because the seat rails
blocked the way (R. 525). Defendant conjectured only that the
cocaine and heroin discovered may have been left there from
another purchase, and that the driver may have kept the cocaine
and heroin from that day's purchase in his pocket (R. 588, 590).
At trial, defendant gave an incredible explanation about how
he ended up innocently involved in a drug transaction, an
explanation completely inconsistent with he pretrial confession.
Defendant contended that he paid the driver five dollars to take
him to see his girlfriend at about 400 East and 900 South, and
that the driver took him to Pioneer Park first (R. 552). After
the transaction, however, the Escort headed north toward
17

defendant's residence (R. 593-94, 616). Defendant also
acknowledged that he was considerably larger than the driver and
rear passenger, that he was not afraid of them, and that he could
have left the car at any time (R. 587).
At trial, defendant partially bolstered his testimony by
contending that the driver offered the officer an incredible
explanation for going to Pioneer Park: that he went there to see
a friend (R. 436). Even if incredible, the incredibility does
not negate the evidence identifying defendant as the purchaser;
at most, it suggests that the driver knew the purpose of going to
the park from the beginning.
In support of his argument that the references to his
silence prejudiced his case, defendant contends that the
references were not "isolated" because there were two: Detective
Thurgood's testimony and the prosecutor's cross-examination.
Appellant's Brief at 12. Although there were two references,
they were distinct and occurred at different times in the
evidence (R. 490, 600-601).

Moreover, the prosecutor made no

reference to defendant's silence in his closing argument (R. 62331).

When weighed against his confession and the other

circumstantial evidence of his guilt, these two brief references
are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
18

Finally, defendant also complains that the trial court gave
no immediate curative instruction.

Appellant's Brief at 13.

However, nothing in the record even suggests that defendant
requested one.

Having failed to request a curative instruction,

defendant cannot complain on appeal when the trial court did not
give one.

See, e.g., State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah

1982), overruled on other grounds/ state vT Long/ 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986) .
Based on the above, any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

This independently establishes that the trial

court did not abuse its wide discretion when it denied
defendant's motion for a new trial.
POINT II
THE FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENSE COUNSEL ABOUT A CHANGE IN
TESTIMONY DID NOT IMPAIR DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO PRESENT
A DEFENSE; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Prior to trial, defense counsel interviewed Officer Kaufman,
who told counsel that he could not remember if he searched the
Escort (R. 419). Detective Thurgood only searched the area
around the passenger seat (R. 484-85).

In her opening statement,

defense counsel pointed out purported inadequacies in the State's
investigation, including the failure to search the entire Escort
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(R. 349-50) . At trial, Officer Kaufman testified that he had
refreshed his memory and remembered searching the entire Escort
(R. 419). He admitted in front of the jury, however, that he had
not informed defense counsel of his refreshed memory, and that he
originally told counsel that he could not remember searching the
entire car (R. 421). The prosecutor first learned of the change
the morning trial began, but did not inform defense counsel about
the change (R. 468).
Defendant included the failure to inform the defense about
the change in Officer Kaufman's memory to support his motion for
a new trial (R. 135-38).
207).

The trial court denied the motion (R.

Because the trial court found any error harmless, it did

not decide whether the State had violated its discovery
obligations.
On appeal, defendant contends that Officer Kaufman's changed
memory harmed his defense because, if counsel had known about it,
counsel could have developed a theory consistent with the
evidence.

Specifically, defendant contends that, if counsel had

known about the change, she ucould have altered and salvaged the
defense, by focusing solely on the state's failure to investigate
and search the other occupants of the car, without putting the
credibility of the defense in issue."
20

Appellant's Brief at 16.

A prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered
inculpatory evidence "might so mislead defendant as to cause
prejudicial error."
1985).

State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah

If defendant can make a credible argument that failing to

disclose inculpatory evidence impaired the defense, the burden
shifts to the State to establish that there exists no reasonable
likelihood of a better result.

State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913,

921 (Utah 1987).
In this case, defendant has not met the threshold to shift
the burden to the State.

Despite the change in Officer Kaufman's

testimony, defendant presented the jury with a cohesive defense.
Defendant asserted that the State's evidence was consistent with
his testimony that the driver, not he, purchased the drugs (R.
631-51).

For example, defense counsel pointed out that Officer

Grant could not see what was going on in the car, and
specifically could not see what the driver was doing during the
purchase (R. 634-35).

Counsel also pointed out that Detective

Thurgood found the drugs in the middle of the floor below the two
foot by two foot seat, and that Officer Kaufman could not see
what the other two occupants were doing during the time it took
the driver to pull over (R. 642).
Defense counsel also relied on the driver's and rear
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passenger's suspicious behavior to suggest that the officers
improperly failed to investigate them, and that, if the officers
had, they might have discovered evidence supporting defendant's
testimony.

Defense counsel pointed out that the driver took

three quarters of a block to pull over, that the driver gave
Officer Kaufman an incredible explanation for not pulling over
when Officer Kaufman first turned on his lights and siren (that
he did not see Kaufman only two cars behind him), that the driver
gave an incredible explanation for going to Pioneer Park (that he
went there to see a friend), and that he gave an incredible
explanation for wanting to leave the scene (that he had left
something cooking on the stove when he went to the park to see a
friend) (R. 639-40).

Counsel then pointed out that, despite this

suspicious behavior, the police let the driver and rear passenger
leave without searching them (R, 640).
Counsel also pointed out that the drug packages Officer
Grant saw during the purchase were sufficiently small to put into
a pocket or a sock (R. 637-38), but that Officer Kaufman released
the driver and rear passenger without searching either of them
(R. 640). Counsel developed the theme that the police acted on
Officer Grant's report that the passenger (defendant) purchased
the drugs and consequently narrowed their investigation to the
22

point that they could have easily overlooked evidence inculpating
the other occupants (R. 637-39, 646-49).
The argument and evidence summarized above rebuts any claim
that the changed memory impaired the defense. Therefore,
defendant has not established the threshold to shift the burden
to the State to establish that, had the State disclosed the
memory change, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result.
Even if this Court did shift the burden to the State to
establish the absence of prejudice, the record establishes that
there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result.
First, as established, defendant still presented a defense based
on the evidence introduced.
Second, defense counsel used the changed memory to attack
Officer Kaufman's general credibility and to attack the
credibility of the State's case.

On cross examination, Officer

Kaufman admitted that in the interview two days prior to trial he
told defense counsel that he could not remember searching the
entire car (R. 419). Counsel then elicited an admission that,
during that interview, Officer Kaufman remembered where he was
when he got Thurgood's transmission to pull the Escort over,
remembered that he saw no furtive movements, remembered that he
23

approached the driver's side first and that Thurgood went to
passenger's side, remembered that they approached the car
simultaneously, remembered that he asked the driver why he went
to Pioneer Park, remembered that the driver told him that he had
gone there to see a friend, remembered asking the driver why
driver took so long to pull over, remembered that the driver
responded that he did not see Officer Kaufman, remembered that
the driver took three quarters of a block to pull over,
remembered that he kept the driver and rear passenger in the car
three to four minutes, remembered that they detained the about
twenty minutes more, but that he did not remember whether he
searched the Escort (R. 444-46) . In closing argument, counsel
also relied on the change to attack the credibility of the
State's case by arguing that the case seemed to get better as
time passed (R. 641).
Third, as previously argued, defendant's version, although
consistent with the evidence was not credible.
Finally, as noted in the previous argument, the State
introduced overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, including
his confession to the crime.
Based on the above, even if counsel had known about Officer
Kaufman's enhanced memory, there would not exist a reasonable
24

likelihood of a more favorable result.

See State v. Carter, 707

P.2d at 662 (failure to disclose inculpatory evidence was
harmless error in light of other substantial evidence introduced
at trial).
Defendant's appellate argument amounts to nothing more than
a complaint that Officer Kaufman's change in memory meant that
his trial counsel made a representation in opening argument that
the evidence ultimately did not support-

This complaint fails to

make a credible argument that the failure to inform defense
counsel about the memory change impaired defendant's defense, let
alone that knowing about it creates the probability of a more
favorable result.

First, depriving defendant of arguing that no

one searched the entire car cannot, by itself, establish an
impairment to the defense: defendant could not rely on an untrue
version of the events, and, as established above, he presented a
defense based on the evidence introduced.
Second, defendant cannot rely on a general taint to the
defense's credibility.

Even though counsel represented that no

one had searched the car, she also established that her statement
was true based on what Officer Kaufman had previously told her
(R. 421). Therefore, Officer Kaufman's testimony established
that counsel had not lied to the jury; rather, she recounted the
25

facts as the State had presented them to her.
Because this record establishes that no reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result existed, the trial court
properly denied defendant's motion for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argue above, the State requests that the
Court affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a
new trial.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

58-37-8

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in
this section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet.
History: C. 1953, 58-37-7.5, enacted by L.
1995, ch. 333, § 3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1995, ch. 333, J 4
makes the act effective on July 1,1995.

58-37-8- Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
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substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child* as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency* means any physical condition requiring the
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain
or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Xb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2Xb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(bXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through
(2XaXvii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
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(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person
not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or fiirnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by
this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source,fraud,forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription,
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
242

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

58-37-8

(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (5Xb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (5Xa)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (5XaXi) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less thanfiveyears if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the'
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to Vi the maximum sentence imposed by law
for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection
supersedes Section 77-18-4.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court,
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb).
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section
76-3-203.5.
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(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controUed substance or substances, is prima facie evidence
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, 5 8; 1972, ch. 22,
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, i 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 19S5,
ch. 146, § 1; 19S6, ch. 196, $ 1; 1987, ch. 92,
§ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 8; 1988, ch, 95, § 1;
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, i 1; 1989, ch.
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1;
1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990,
ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198,
§ 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, 5 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added the last
sentence in Subsection (9Xa) and rewrote Sub-

section (9Xd) which read "Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002.*
Cross-References. — Cities and towns, prohibitions of sales of narcotics to minors, § 108-47.
Psychotozic chemical solvents, penalties for
use or sale, § 76-10-101 et seq.
Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
AKALYSIS

Constitutionality.
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